"WAR
IS HELL":
THE BATTLE OF
SHILOH FOR BEGINNERS
by Fred Skolnik
The
American Civil
War began on April
12-13, 1861, with
the bombardment
and capture of
Fort Sumter in
Charleston Harbor
by Confederate
forces under P.G.T
Beauregard. South
Carolina had been
the first of the
Southern states
to secede from
the Union, on
December 20, 1860,
following Lincoln's
victory in the
presidential elections.
The remaining
ten states of
the Confederacy
followed suit
over the next
six months.
The cause of the
Civil War was
ostensibly the
issue of slavery,
though Lincoln
had declared that
he would only
ban it in the
new states formed
out of the western
territories. However,
resentment in
the South ran
very deep, fueled
by the air of
moral superiority
assumed by the
North and the
financial stranglehold
of New York and
Boston bankers
on the rural South.
Churchill called
the War the most
unavoidable in
modern history
and such, apparently,
it was.
After Sumter and
the opening skirmishes,
rebel forces under
Joseph Johnston
with Beauregard
as his deputy
occupied Bull
Run Creek, just
25 miles from
Washington on
the Virginia side
of the Potomac.
On July 17, Federal
forces under the
command of Irwin
McDowell attacked
them and were
promptly routed.
The North needed
a savior and,
in George McClellan,
Lincoln thought
he had one. But
the new commander-in-chief
of the Union armies,
replacing the
venerable Winfield
Scott, was in
no hurry to make
war. He spent
a leisurely fall
and winter preparing
his troops and
only struck south
in March 1862,
aiming to capture
Richmond, but
would be driven
back by Robert
E. Lee in seven
days of fierce
fighting (June
25 – July
1) at the gates
of the Confederate
capitol. By that
time, the war
in the West was
in full swing.
Unlike the Eastern
theater of operations,
the Western theater
was spread over
a vast geographical
area, ranging
from the mountains
of eastern Tennessee
to the Pacific
Coast, and presented
a broad range
of strategic opportunities,
with three great
rivers –
the Mississippi,
the Cumberland
and the Tennessee
– reaching
deep into the
soft underbelly
of the South,
while, on the
other hand, two
states of doubtful
loyalty –
Kentucky and Missouri
– sat astride
a thin layer of
Northern states.
Therefore, though
the burden of
conquest was on
the North, it
was not clear
from the outset
on whose ground
the struggle would
be decided.
In Missouri, feelings
were mixed. Three-quarters
of the state's
inhabitants were
of Southern origin,
and Southern sympathizers,
led by Governor
Claiborne Fox
Jackson, dominated
its politics.
On the other hand,
St. Louis was
a hotbed of abolitionist
sentiment with
an absolute majority
of German and
Irish immigrants
while the state
as a whole had
a Northern economic
orientation owing
to its growing
industrialization
and the railroad
that tied it to
the east. Therefore
its inhabitants
wanted in effect
to have things
both ways, neither
to secede from
the Union nor
join the Northern
war effort.
Not so Governor
Jackson, who controlled
a pro-South militia
and had his eye
on the Federal
armory in St.
Louis. When Nathaniel
Lyon, a fiercely
aggressive officer
responsible for
one of the worst
massacres in the
history of America's
wars against the
Indians, was sent
there to take
charge of the
Federal troops
and occupied the
hills surrounding
the armory, Jackson
and his 900 militiamen
set up a training
base outside the
city. On May 10,
1861, Lyon surrounded
it with 7,000
volunteers, mostly
Germans, and forced
its surrender,
leading the prisoners
through the city
to a chorus of
angry shouts and
curses from Southern
sympathizers.
Things quickly
got out of hand,
shots were fired,
and 25 civilians
were killed and
75 wounded. The
next day thousands
of Southern sympathizers
fled the city.
After the two
sides failed to
reach an understanding
about public order,
Jackson returned
to his capitol
at Jefferson City,
100 miles to the
south, and issued
a call for 50,000
militiamen to
defend the state.
Lyon immediately
struck south.
Jackson fell back
another 50 miles,
to Booneville,
where Sterling
Price, a former
governor of Missouri
and now commander
of the state militia
on Jackson's behalf,
tried to organize
the volunteers.
They then fled
toward the Arkansas
border, hoping
to make contact
with Confederate
forces. These
came up to Wilson's
Creek in early
August, where
Lyon attacked
them though he
had just 5,400
men compared to
the rebel force
of 11,000. In
the heat of the
fighting, after
being wounded
twice, Lyon took
a bullet to the
chest and was
killed. The rest
of the Federal
army, which had
suffered 1,200
casualties like
the rebels, then
retreated north.
By now John Frémont,
the famous Pathfinder
of the West and
a bit of a blowhard,
had arrived to
take command,
but was content
to remain in St.
Louis surrounded
by an entourage
of foreign dignitaries
while Price moved
north with his
men. Finally at
the end of September,
Frémont
began to advance
toward Price at
a snail's pace
with an army of
38,000 men. Price
now had just 7,000
volunteers and
moved them into
the southwest
corner of the
state. Frémont,
guilty not only
of military incompetence
but also of colossal
waste and corruption,
was now removed
from command and
replaced by a
new savior from
the West, Henry
Halleck.
Like Missouri,
Kentucky preferred
to remain "neutral"
in the War Between
the States. This
did not prevent
Kentuckians from
organizing rival
militias just
across state lines
or both sides
from undertaking
warlike measures
within its borders.
Command of the
Cumberland District,
which included
Kentucky and Tennessee,
had been placed
in the hands of
William Tecumseh
Sherman, who had
fought at Bull
Run. Sherman was
one of the most
colorful and complex
of the figures
brought into prominence
by the war –
a true original
whose nonstop
talking, wild
gesticulating
manner, sloppy
dress and straw
hat were the exterior
signs of a volatile
and impulsive
temperament. Sherman
had grown up in
Ohio without a
father, raised
by the all-powerful
Thomas Ewing,
and had even married
the Senator's
daughter after
leaving the regular
army, but all
his efforts to
support his family
had failed. And
now the pressure
of high command
turned out to
be more than his
nerves could stand
and within a month
he suffered a
complete mental
collapse and was
sent home to recuperate
after reporting
to his old friend
Henry Halleck.
In the same month
of November 1861,
another former
regular army officer
who had not fared
too well in civilian
or, for that matter,
army life was
ordered to create
a diversion to
keep Confederate
forces from reinforcing
the rebels in
Missouri. This
was Ulysses S.
Grant, of whom
it would be said
that he only succeeded
in two things
in his life: in
war and in his
marriage. Separation
from his wife
had aggravated
his drinking problem
and he had had
to resign from
the army under
a cloud in 1854,
but the new war
brought new opportunities
and required a
skill that he
possessed. First
he was given a
regiment and within
a month was made
a brigadier of
volunteers and
given command
of a military
district with
headquarters in
Cairo, Illinois.
Grant knew how
to seize an opportunity.
Unlike Sherman,
who felt that
he had to prove
himself to his
powerful father-in-law
and his spoiled
daughter, Grant
had always had
the support of
an adoring wife
and was entirely
at peace with
himself despite
his failures,
and full of self-confidence.
Now he decided
on his own to
turn the demonstration
of force he had
been ordered to
make into a full-fledged
military operation,
transporting his
men down the Mississippi,
crossing over
to the Missouri
side and capturing
a rebel outpost
at Belmont. While
his men were busy
looting it, the
rebels sent reinforcements
across the river
from the Kentucky
side. Grant set
the enemy camp
on fire to get
his men's attention
but realized that
it was time to
call it quits
before they were
cut off, and everyone
now raced to the
transports waiting
for them in the
river. Grant was
the last to make
it to the boats,
his horse sliding
down the embankment
on its hind quarters
after a furious
gallop. Each side
lost over 600
men, including
the many wounded
that Grant left
behind. In the
North there was
not a little criticism
of the pointless
battle, but Grant
had made a name
for himself.
Halleck had arrived
in St. Louis on
November 19 to
replace Frémont.
Don Carlos Buell
had arrived in
Louisville, Kentucky,
on November 13
to replace Sherman.
Between them they
now ruled the
West, under the
very loose reins
of the Commanding
General, George
McClellan, who
had problems of
his own back East.
Halleck was known
as "Old Brains,"
having written
a book called
Elements of Military
Art and Science
and translated
Jomini's Life
of Napoleon. He
had gotten rich
in California,
married Alexander
Hamilton's granddaughter,
and resigned from
the regular army
at the age of
40. Looking more
like a banker
than a general
with his bulging
eyes, loose jowls
and a number of
repulsive mannerisms,
he treated everyone
with contempt
and was not too
well liked himself.
While Halleck
organized, Buell
temporized. It
was George Thomas,
another Old Army
officer and destined
to become the
Rock of Chickamauga,
who got Buell
to agree to an
expedition to
Eastern Kentucky,
whose loyalty
to the Union Lincoln
considered of
vital importance.
Thomas set out
on January 1,
1862, and marched
100 miles in rain,
mud and snow with
6,500 men, each
carrying 20 lbs.
of equipment.
On January 19,
he attacked the
rebels at Mill
Spring (Logan's
Cross Roads),
routing them and
in effect saving
Eastern Kentucky
for the Union.
Halleck now felt
compelled to act
as well and agreed
to let Grant lead
an expedition
against the two
rebel fortresses,
Ft. Henry and
Ft. Donelson,
10 miles apart,
that controlled
the Tennessee
and Cumberland
Rivers in northern
Tennessee. Grant
organized a force
of 17,000 men
and a fleet of
transports and
gunboats to bring
them up the Tennessee
from Cairo to
Ft. Henry. He
had planned to
surround the fortress,
but nature did
the work for him,
as it had been
unwisely located
on low ground
and was now flooded
by the Tennessee,
causing the rebels
to evacuate it
in favor of Ft.
Donelson before
Grant could organize
his assault. Grant
announced to Halleck
that he would
take Ft. Donelson
in two days' time,
on February 8.
Halleck had no
choice but to
go along, though
Grant was moving
a little too quickly
to suit his cautious
nature.
Grant was delayed
by heavy rains
and only moved
out on the 12th.
Two divisions,
commanded by John
McClernand and
John Smith, marched
overland while
the gunboats and
transports with
additional troops
sailed back and
this time came
up the Cumberland.
The weather was
fine so without
thinking too much
the men on the
march threw away
their coats and
blankets. On the
morning of the
13th, they reached
their destination,
waiting now for
the boats to arrive.
But there was
a very big surprise
in store for Grant.
Donelson was now
defended by 17,000
men, determined
to block any Federal
advance toward
Nashville. Also
among Donelson's
defenders were
1,300 cavalrymen
commanded by Nathan
Bedford Forrest,
a slave trader
who had personally
financed the organization
of his battalion.
Unlike Ft. Henry,
Donelson was perfectly
positioned, on
15 acres of high
ground, surrounded
by artillery and
defended by creeks
or ravines on
its flanks and
3 miles of strong
fortifications
in its front.
Grant sent his
two divisions
forward but they
could not make
much headway.
A little later
the gunboats arrived
and opened fire
on the fortress.
The gunfire continued
throughout the
day. In the night
the temperature
dropped to -10°
and it snowed,
burying Grant's
men in their summer
uniforms. The
wounded between
the lines who
had not been burned
to death by the
fires ignited
in the woods by
the exploding
shells screamed
for mercy during
the night. In
the morning an
additional 10,000
men arrived and
Grant attacked
in the center
while another
artillery duel
developed. In
the night it rained
and snowed and
the men again
stood exposed
in the freezing
cold.
Inside the fort,
the atmosphere
was gloomy. The
three Confederate
commanders –
John Floyd, a
Virginia politician;
Gideon Pillow,
A Tennessee lawyer;
and Simon Bolivar
Buckner, a West
Point graduate
– agreed
that it was impossible
to hold on, so
on the night of
the 14th they
decided to break
out the following
morning and try
to reach Nashville.
At 6 a.m., when
Grant's men were
just coming to
life and Grant
himself was on
one of the boats,
Pillow's division
came out in full
force and attacked
McClernand on
Grant's right
with Forrest and
his riders, looking
like ghosts, in
the lead. Pillow
came up against
Richard Oglesby's
brigade on McClernand's
right and despite
the fierce resistance
was able to push
it back. Forrest
rode into the
enemy flank and
captured six cannons.
By 10 a.m. just
a single regiment
of Oglesby's remained
in the area and
McClernand's right
was now fully
exposed. By 11
a.m. the way to
Nashville was
open. But here
Pillow stopped
to celebrate,
dispatching a
messenger to send
out a telegram
announcing his
victory and then
berating Buckner
in the center
for not fighting
hard enough. Then,
all of a sudden,
the fighting unaccountably
ground to a halt.
Everyone stood
around talking
instead of advancing
and then it was
one o'clock and
Grant arrived.
He did not like
what he saw and
prepared to mount
a counterattack,
riding over to
Smith on the left,
but in the meanwhile
Pillow surprised
everyone by calling
off his own attack
and ordering Buckner
back to the fortress,
either having
lost his nerve
or believing,
as he later claimed,
that a Federal
reinforcement
of 20,000 men
was on the way.
Buckner could
not believe what
he was hearing.
Grant ordered
Smith to attack
and he now smashed
into Buckner's
retreating men
while McClernand
swung around and
closed the road
to Nashville again.
Back in the fortress,
the rebels spent
another gloomy
night. The three
senior officers
decided that it
would be best
to surrender.
However, Floyd
did not intend
to wait around,
arguing that with
his political
past, things would
go hard on him
as a prisoner,
and commandeered
one of the transports
evacuating the
wounded for his
escape. Pillow
volunteered to
join him. Buckner,
the junior officer
among them, preferred
to stay, and in
a bizarre ceremony,
Floyd transferred
command to Pillow
and Pillow transferred
command to Buckner,
each pronouncing
the words formally,
and Buckner finally
saying, "I
assume it."
Forrest informed
them that he had
no intention of
surrendering his
men and before
dawn quietly slipped
away, letting
200 infantrymen
hitch rides on
his horses.
Buckner requested
a ceasefire from
Grant so that
they could discuss
the terms of the
surrender. Grant
replied immediately:
"No terms
except an immediate
and unconditional
surrender can
be accepted. I
propose to move
immediately on
your works."
Buckner had no
choice but to
accept the "ungenerous
and unchivalrous"
ultimatum from
his old army friend
whom he had helped
out when Grant
arrived in New
York nearly penniless
after resigning
from the army.
When Grant arrived
in the fortress,
however, they
chatted amiably
and Grant joked
that Pillow would
have had nothing
to worry about
as he was of more
use to the North
as a Southern
commander than
as a prisoner.
He also did not
mind that hundreds
of rebel soldiers
slipped out of
the fortress and
escaped while
they were talking,
as holding them
would have been
a hindrance. He
informed Halleck
that he had taken
between 12,000
and 15,000 prisoners,
though in the
end he probably
had no more than
10,000. He had
also captured
2,000-4,000 horses,
65 cannons and
20,000 rifles
while reporting
2,832 Union losses
as opposed to
the 2,000 reported
by Pillow for
the rebels. With
the forts in Union
hands, the rebels
were also forced
to abandon Nashville.
Grant was now
a national hero,
known as Unconditional
Surrender Grant.
Halleck, however,
was not one of
his admirers,
despite the brilliant
victory at Fort
Donelson, or perhaps
because of it,
not to mention
the residue of
seediness that
attached to his
past. In fact,
he would have
been happy to
get rid of him
altogether and
in early March
ordered Grant
to remain in Fort
Henry while Smith
undertook the
next mission that
Halleck had in
mind: an expedition
up the Tennessee
River to tear
up the railroad
and isolate Albert
Sidney Johnston
and his troops
before attacking
them.
Grant really did
not understand
what Halleck had
against him and
demanded a hearing,
also threatening
to resign. Word
got to Lincoln,
who wanted to
know what was
going on, and
Halleck backed
down quickly enough,
sending Grant
south to take
command of Smith's
force, with the
single proviso
that he refrain
from attacking
Johnston until
Buell, coming
over from Nashville
with 50,000 men,
linked up with
him.
Grant caught up
with Smith at
Savannah, on the
eastern bank of
the Tennessee,
about 80 miles
south of Fort
Henry and 20 miles
from the Alabama
border. Smith
had about half
his troops with
him (three divisions).
The rest were
a few miles upstream
(south), at Crump's
and Pittsburg
Landing. Smith
was also hospitalized
at the time with
an infection picked
up when he scraped
his foot (and
the 19th century
being what it
was, died within
a month). From
Pittsburg Landing,
Sherman, back
on duty with a
division of raw
recruits, persuaded
Grant that it
was an ideal place
to mass the troops,
so Grant sent
him the three
divisions at Savannah
with instructions
to deploy them
as he saw fit.
Grant, meanwhile,
remained where
he was, awaiting
the arrival of
Buell, who had
advanced to within
80 miles by March
18 but then allowed
himself to be
delayed for ten
days by a flooded
river and a burnt
bridge.
Pittsburg Landing
consisted of a
few cabins and
a general store.
It was situated
about 100 feet
above the water,
between two marshy
creeks 3-5 miles
apart. The large
plain between
them was cut by
deep ravines.
Sherman placed
his own division
(minus a brigade)
a little to the
west of Shiloh
Church, 2 1/2
miles from the
Landing. He then
deployed Benjamin
Prentiss's division
to his left and
his own last brigade
about 250 yards
to the left of
Prentiss, extending
it to the southern
creek (Lick Creek).
Behind Sherman
and Prentiss,
closer to the
river in order
to guard the bridge
there, were William
Wallace (on the
right) and Stephen
Hurlbut (on the
left), and between
Wallace and Sherman
– John McClernand.
Altogether, Sherman
had 35,000 men
on the plain.
Lew Wallace's
sixth division
was busy tearing
up the railroad
to the north.
The weather was
beautiful, the
trees were in
blossom and a
carpet of green
covered the ground.
However, though
Sherman had ordered
all brigades to
face west and
all regiments
to remain in contact
with one another
in order to be
ready for battle,
they did as they
pleased, facing
in every direction
and getting as
far away from
each other as
they could. No
one, including
Sherman, believed
that the distant
Confederate forces
would dare to
attack and therefore
he did not even
order them to
fortify their
camps. The men
settled in as
though they were
out on a summer
excursion, setting
up ovens to bake
bread and fixing
up comfortable
beds.
Twenty miles to
the southwest,
at Corinth, Albert
Sidney Johnston,
an experienced
Old Army officer,
was just beginning
to get his Army
of Mississippi
into shape. He
had 15,000 of
his own men under
William Hardee
and Nathan Bedford
Forrest while
his deputy, our
old friend Beauregard,
who had been shipped
out to the West
because he could
not get along
with anyone in
the East (being
Joseph Johnston's
deputy, Secretary
of War Judah Benjamin
had reminded him,
meant being deputy
commander of the
whole army and
not commander
of half of it),
had scraped together
another 25,000,
including 10,000
from Pensacola
and Mobile under
the command of
Braxton Bragg,
a fierce disciplinarian
known for his
iron hand and
wooden head. Once,
as both commander
and quartermaster
of a company,
it was said, he
had conducted
a spirited correspondence
with himself.
As commander he
had requested
certain urgent
supplies. As quartermaster
he denied the
request. His wife
too had grown
to be somewhat
fierce, urging
him to place his
Tennessee men
where his batteries
could fire at
them if they tried
to run away.
Beauregard soon
convinced Johnston
to attack the
Federal army and
Johnston was happy
to let Beauregard
draw up the order
of battle, whose
key element was
to be surprise.
Two roads led
from Corinth to
Pittsburg Landing.
The rebel army
was divided between
them and ordered
to rendezvous
where the roads
met 5 miles from
the Landing, between
the two creeks,.
Beauregard had
his chief of staff
write up the orders,
which he did with
a copy of Napoleon's
orders for the
Battle of Waterloo
at his elbow as
a model. The final
product was an
elaborate document
that called for
a level of coordination
far beyond the
capabilities of
an inexperienced
army. Johnston
approved everything
without batting
an eye.
The army numbered
three corps, under
Bragg, Hardee
and Leonidas Polk,
an Episcopalian
bishop and descendant
of the 11th president.
John Breckinridge,
vice president
of the United
States under Buchanan,
commanded the
reserves and Forrest
the cavalry. The
basic plan was
to attack the
enemy in three
waves of 10,000
men each with
Forrest's 4,000
riders on the
flanks, cut off
his line of retreat
to the river by
flanking his left,
and drive him
toward Owl Creek
to the north.
Each soldier carried
100 rounds of
ammunition and
supplies for three
days. Supplies
for two additional
days were kept
in the wagons
and each artillery
piece had 200
rounds of ammunition.
Rebel reconnaissance
had already ascertained
that the Federal
camps were unfortified
and poorly placed
for rapid deployment.
On April 3, Southern
forces began to
move out, though
not without many
delays, with the
mud, the narrow
roads and the
thick woods all
contributing to
the general confusion.
Hardee reached
the rendezvous
point the next
morning instead
of on the same
evening because,
he claimed, Polk
was in his way.
Bragg, for his
part, got in Polk's
way. On the afternoon
of April 4, Hardee
ran into Union
scouts. It was
clear now that
the element of
surprise had been
lost. It rained
during the night.
Johnston and Beauregard
waited impatiently
while Bragg went
looking for a
lost division.
"This is
perfectly puerile!"
Johnston exclaimed.
"This is
not war!"
Bragg found his
division but this
time it was Polk
who got in his
way and another
day was lost.
Beauregard was
of the opinion
that the entire
attack should
be called off.
Bragg, a pessimist
by nature, agreed.
Johnston declared:
"We shall
attack at daylight."
On the night of
April 5, Hardee
camped around
2 miles west of
Shiloh Church.
The brigades of
Thomas Hindman
and Sterling Wood
occupied his center,
Patrick Cleburne
was on his left
and Gladden with
a brigade from
Bragg's corps
was on the right.
Hindman had fought
in Mexico before
becoming a Congressman
and Cleburne had
served in the
British army before
emigrating from
Ireland in 1849.
Behind them, Bragg
deployed Jonas
Withers' division
on the right and
Ruggles' division
on the left. Both
were West Point
graduates. In
the third line
under Polk, Frank
Cheatham, fighter
and drinker, waited
far to the left
near the railroad,
ready to link
up with Clark
on the right.
Breckinridge too
was on the right
with his 6,000-man
reserve.
The utter chaos
that had accompanied
the rebel advance,
including random
gunfire, bugle
calls, drum rolls
and the encounter
with the Federal
scouts –
in a word, everything
that had convinced
Beauregard that
there was not
a chance in the
world of surprising
Grant –
did not cause
a single eyebrow
to be raised among
the Federal commanders.
When Forrest appeared
on his big white
horse at the head
of a cavalry force,
about half a mile
away, Sherman
assumed that they
were just keeping
an eye on Federal
movements. Grant
was still in Savannah,
this time with
a twisted ankle
after taking a
fall with his
horse, and still
waiting for Buell.
He too believed
that there was
no chance of a
rebel attack.
On April 5 he
wrote to Halleck
that most of the
rebel army, numbering
80,000 men in
his estimate,
was still at Corinth.
When the first
of Buell's five
divisions (Nelson's)
arrived during
the day (the last
was still 40 miles
away), Grant ordered
him to wait on
the left bank
of the river.
Buell himself
arrived in the
evening but Grant
did not bother
to meet with him.
The next morning,
as he was having
his coffee with
his staff, artillery
fire like the
rumble of distant
thunder was suddenly
heard from the
direction of Pittsburg
Landing. Grant
kept a poker face.
"Gentlemen,"
he said, "the
ball is in motion.
Let's be off."
Sherman was not
convinced that
he was being attacked
until he saw the
Confederate lines
moving toward
him in full force.
His three brigades
were ranged around
Shiloh Church
in a general southwesterly
direction, John
McDowell on the
right, Buckland
in the center
and Hildebrand
on the left, but
with each regiment
facing any which
way. In truth,
there was not
really much difference
in fighting ability
between the rival
armies. Many of
the men barely
knew how to load
a gun and not
a few were wearing
the clownish straw
hats that had
become so popular
since the beginning
of the war. Not
for nothing did
Wiley Sword, in
his Shiloh: Bloody
April, call the
armies "two
herds of apprentice
killers."
Sherman's commanders
were nothing to
get excited about
either. Buckland
was a lawyer,
Hildebrand was
over 60 years
old and John McDowell,
Irwin's brother,
had no real fighting
experience. Prentiss
next door was
a little more
fortunate with
his two brigade
commanders if
not with the quality
of his soldiers.
Miller had fought
in Mexico and
Peabody had seen
some action in
Missouri. But
like Sherman,
and perhaps influenced
by his cavalier
attitude, Prentiss
too ignored every
report of increased
enemy activity
in his front.
Not so Peabody.
When his scouts
reported seeing
enemy campfires
and hearing cheers
and shouts somewhere
in the distance
on the night of
the 5th, he sent
out five companies
at three in the
morning to make
contact with the
enemy (though
Prentiss laughed
off his apprehensions).
At five in the
morning they ran
into rebel pickets
in the southwest
corner of Fraley
field, about half
a mile from Prentiss's
and Sherman's
forward positions.
Peabody sent another
five companies
into the fray,
but it was too
late. Hardee's
entire corps was
moving on the
Northern camps
"like an
Alpine avalanche,"
in Beauregard's
words. The battle
had begun in earnest.
The first of the
rebels to come
up against Peabody
were the men of
the 3rd Mississippi
(Wood's brigade),
who had camped
nearby. Now they
exchanged fire
until the rest
of the brigade
arrived on the
scene. Hindman's
brigade (under
the command of
R. G. Shaver)
came up on Wood's
right. Peabody
brought up the
rest of his brigade
(around 1,100
men) and established
a 400-yard line
of defense on
a ridge overlooking
a ravine. The
rebels advanced
to within 75 yards
and the two forces
opened fire. The
two regiments
on Wood's right
– the 3rd
Mississippi and
the 55th Tennessee
– immediately
ran away. At 8:15,
Hindman, who now
commanded the
two rebel brigades
as a division,
ordered Shaver
to charge the
enemy line. The
rebels crossed
the ravine with
bayonets drawn
and wild screams
and overran Peabody's
two flanks. The
Northerners began
to flee toward
their camps. Prentiss
rode from camp
to camp trying
to rally the men
while Miller led
his brigade to
Spain field, far
to the left, where
they ran into
Gladden and Chalmers
from Withers'
division (Bragg's
corps). Prentiss
then ordered a
retreat to the
other side of
the field, where
his men deployed
under cover of
the woods, backed
up by two batteries.
Gladden moved
into the field
with his men at
8:30 and was himself
fatally wounded.
Adams took command
of the brigade,
which was now
hit by canister
fire from Prentiss's
guns. When Adams
got to the middle
of the field,
Prentiss doubled
the canister load,
causing Adams
to retreat. But
many of Prentiss's
men could not
take the pressure
either and began
dropping out of
the firing line
and moving toward
the river together
with the wounded.
Peabody, on Prentiss's
right, rode into
one of his camps
and there, after
being wounded
four times in
the course of
the morning's
fighting, he was
killed. By 8:45,
all of Peabody's
camps had been
captured by the
rebels. In Spain
field, Adams was
again ordered
to attack. Federal
batteries kept
firing until most
of their horses
were killed and
their crews fled.
On Miller's left
the 18th Wisconsin
was driven back
by a bayonet charge
by the 10th Mississippi
(Chalmers' brigade).
Panic now overtook
Prentiss's men
and a wild flight
commenced. Some
of the men ran
back through their
camps to salvage
some personal
memento from their
tents. By 9 in
the morning, seven
broken regiments
were on their
way to Pittsburg
Landing.
All this while,
from 6 a.m., Sherman
too had been under
attack. The first
to make contact
with the enemy
were the pickets
of the 53rd Ohio
from Hildebrand's
brigade on Sherman's
left. The 53rd
Ohio, asleep in
its camp, was
in fact isolated
in Rhea field,
about 400 yards
from the 57th
Ohio. Appler,
the commander
of the 53rd, in
great agitation,
ordered his men
to form a line
of defense behind
a hill along the
northern edge
of the field.
Sherman arrived
on the scene and
saw his aide-de-camp
shot down beside
him by Cleburne's
skirmishers, who
were coming up
the muddy Corinth
road in two columns,
their rifles cradled
in their arms
as if they were
out partridge
hunting. Sherman
galloped to the
rear to bring
up reinforcements.
Appler hid behind
a tree and when
he saw all of
Cleburne's brigade
coming out of
the woods, ran
away, as did many
of his men. Those
who did not opened
fire on the two
rebel regiments
on Cleburne's
right –
the 6th Mississippi
and the 23rd Tennessee
– who were
now moving up
the hill. It was
7:45. The fire
was murderous.
One of the men
swore that he
saw the bullets
flying overhead
like swarms of
buzzing bees.
An officer riding
through the woods
toward the battlefield
heard a patter
in the leaves
that he took to
be raindrops until
he realized they
were bullets.
Cleburne's two
regiments were
torn to pieces
with the aid of
the Northern cannons.
The 6th Mississippi
regrouped in the
abandoned camp
of the 53rd Ohio
and attacked again.
This time only
60 men came back
(out of the 425
who had gone into
battle). Appler's
men did not wait
around for the
next attack. They
too retreated.
In their rear,
Hildebrand's other
two regiments
– the 57th
and 77th Ohio
– who were
there to support
Appler, lay frozen
on the ground
behind one of
the creeks in
the area, not
daring to move.
West of the Corinth
road, the four
regiments on Cleburne's
left attacked
Buckland's brigade.
But Buckland had
the advantage
of ground and
numbers and met
them with fierce
fire. Cleburne,
who had fallen
from his horse
but continued
to lead his men
on foot covered
with mud, lost
1,000 men in his
stubborn assaults.
By this time the
three rebel waves
of attackers were
all mixed together.
Patton Anderson
from Bragg's corps
(Ruggles' division)
with Russell from
Polk's corps (Clark's
division) entered
Rhea field at
around 8:30. They
quickly got bogged
down in the mud
and underbrush
and when two of
Russell's regiments
were hit by a
deadly volley
and ran for their
lives, the panic
spread to Anderson's
brigade and another
three regiments
hastened to the
rear. Bragg observed
"Polk's mob"
with disgust.
Just then his
horse took a bullet
in the head and
he was forced
to use "an
inferior animal"
to chase the fleeing
rebels. In their
stead came Bushrod
Johnson's men,
also from Polk's
corps, and two
of his regiments
together with
what was left
of Anderson's
and Russell's
brigades advanced
on Waterhouse's
cannons, which
had previously
decimated Cleburne.
The attack broke
the back of the
57th Ohio and
the remnants of
the 53rd still
in the area, who
now joined the
Northern troops
streaming toward
the Landing. Waterhouse
was killed. Without
the support of
infantry, the
battery retreated
under a flanking
attack from the
13th Tennessee
(Russell's brigade)
and lost three
guns. And finally,
the 77th Ohio
simply melted
away and joined
the flight. Sherman's
left had now ceased
to exist.
In the meantime,
Julius Raith,
sent forward by
McClernand to
help Sherman,
advanced toward
Sherman's nonexistent
left and ran into
Wood, who had
continued to advance
after routing
Peabody, and Alexander
Stewart (both
from Polk's corps).
At the same time,
Bushrod Johnson's
two remaining
regiments along
with three of
Anderson's moved
against another
of Sherman's batteries,
commanded by Samuel
Barrett at Shiloh
Church. Sherman
ordered Barrett
to move back 500
yards to a new
line on the Purdy
road. Buckland
and McDowell were
also ordered to
take up the new
position. However,
when Buckland
tried to get there
he ran into Frederick
Behr's battery
in full flight
to the east as
well as the remnants
of Hildebrand's
brigade fleeing
west. In the ensuing
confusion, Buckland's
brigade dissolved
and disappeared
from sight. Behr
was ordered to
the Corinth road
junction but was
killed and his
men abandoned
their guns and
again fled. Of
all of Sherman's
troops, only McDowell's
brigade still
maintained a semblance
of order. It was
now 10 o'clock.
Sherman took in
the scene quite
calmly. Four horses
had already been
shot out from
under him, his
wounded hand was
bleeding and his
uniform was in
tatters. But in
terms of his usual
erratic behavior
– the compulsive
smoking, the nervous
talking and the
wild arm waving
– the battle
had had a salutary
effect. Adversity
brought out the
best in him. And
then, finally,
Grant arrived.
We had left him
in Savannah over
his morning coffee.
However, the moment
he heard the distant
artillery fire
he ordered Nelson
to march his division
to Pittsburg Landing
via the east bank
of the river,
loaded his staff
and their horses
onto a steamboat,
and set out for
the battlefield,
leaving behind
a note for Buell.
"I have been
looking for this,"
he wrote, trying
to save face,
"but did
not believe the
attack could be
made before Monday
or Tuesday."
(It was Sunday
then.) At 7:30,
Grant passed Crump's
Landing and shouted
across the water
to Lew Wallace,
future author
of Ben Hur, who
had been tearing
up railroad tracks
in the area, to
hold his division
in readiness.
At 9 o'clock he
reached Pittsburg
Landing, where
the sounds of
battle were drawing
nearer by the
minute. Next to
the two cabins
serving as a field
hospital there
were already big
piles of amputated
arms and legs.
Grant rode up
the river bank
with his crutch
strapped to his
saddle and galloped
toward the sound
of fire. The signs
of battle were
all around him:
dying men and
horses everywhere,
smashed wagons,
uprooted trees,
men marching in
different directions,
artillerymen calmly
firing their artillery
pieces and here
and there a clash
of arms, but most
of all the shouts
and screams and
smoke and fire
as far as the
eye could see,
without any order
or logic. Grant
in fact beheld
a scene of utter
chaos and whether
he knew it or
not was now facing
the greatest test
of his life. Thousands
of soldiers were
streaming toward
the river to huddle
there like sheep
under the bluff.
Thousands were
lying dead and
wounded on the
battlefield. Grant's
entire army looked
like it was about
to collapse.
Grant sent orders
to Lew Wallace
to bring up his
division as quickly
as possible, made
sure that ammunition
was being properly
distributed to
the troops in
the field, and
ordered two Iowa
regiments who
had just arrived
at the Landing
to block the flow
of men to the
rear. Then he
made a tour of
the battlefield,
riding over to
William Wallace
and Hurlbut and
finally to Sherman
at 10 o'clock.
Sherman was already
deployed on the
Purdy road with
the remnants of
his division and
assured Grant
that he was all
right. Grant did
not doubt that
Sherman was capable
of holding on
and therefore
continued on his
way to find Prentiss,
who was also in
the midst of establishing
a new line of
defense. The first
troops to take
up the new position
were two of Hurlbut's
brigades who had
come up earlier
to reinforce Prentiss
when he was under
attack by Gladden
and Chalmers in
Spain field. But
the two brigades
quickly crumpled
and Hurlbut ordered
the rest of his
men to fall back
and establish
still another
line of defense
in a 10-acre peach
orchard next to
"the River
Road." By
10 o'clock Prentiss
too had rounded
up a few of his
regiments and
deployed them
with two batteries
in a sunken road
to the right of
Hurlbut. Finally,
William Wallace
sent two brigades
forward and they
took up a position
to the right of
Prentiss in Duncan
field. The new
line numbered
11,300 men –
Hurlbut at the
orchard with 4,500,
Prentiss in the
center with 1,000,
and Wallace on
the right with
5,800 men and
seven batteries
(58 guns). Wallace
immediately became
engaged in an
artillery duel,
so loud that a
terrified rabbit
overcame its natural
fear of man and
snuggled up to
one of the soldiers.
Since the early
hours of the morning,
the Confederate
corps commanders
– Hardee,
Polk and Bragg
– and their
commander Albert
Sidney Johnston
had been riding
among their men
to urge them on.
Beauregard had
remained in the
rear to send up
troops and Breckinridge
waited on the
right with his
reserve. Despite
the initial success,
the Confederate
advance had slowed
down somewhat
by around 10 o'clock
as Union forces
began to dig in
in their new line
of defense while
hundreds if not
thousands of rebel
soldiers looted
the abandoned
camps and glutted
themselves on
the culinary delicacies
they found there.
Opposite Sherman
on the right,
Pond's brigade
(Ruggles' division,
Bragg's corps)
advanced cautiously
while in the center
the rebels were
content to exchange
artillery fire
with Wallace and
also on the far
left, where Sherman
had stationed
his last brigade
to guard the bridge
over Lick Creek,
they got bogged
down. The brigade
was commanded
by David Stuart,
an ambitious lawyer
and former Congressman,
and numbered 2,800
men. Johnston
was convinced
that he had a
division opposite
him there and,
fearing that it
might outflank
him, dispatched
Chalmers, who
had just finished
dealing with Prentiss,
and on his heels,
John Jackson,
who commanded
the third brigade
in Withers' division
(Polk's corps).
Chalmers advanced
with 2,000 men,
The untried soldiers
of Stuart's 71st
Ohio and 55th
Illinois immediately
fled. The Zouaves
of the 54th Ohio
put up a brief
fight and then
retreated too.
Stuart requested
reinforcements
and received William
Wallace's third
brigade (John
McArthur), which
was able to block
the rebel advance.
Now the most violent
fighting of the
day was about
to begin, in Bragg's
sector. Since
rebel units had
become hopelessly
mixed together,
the corps commanders
had wisely decided
to divide the
front among themselves:
Hardee opposite
Sherman, Polk
opposite McClernand
and Bragg opposite
Prentiss, who
was deployed in
the sunken road.
This was an unused
road along a low-lying
ridge in a kind
of shallow trench
or ditch covered
with brush –
a strong position
by any standard.
The rebels quickly
named it the Hornet's
Nest.
The first to try
its luck against
Prentiss was Stevens'
brigade (Cheatham's
division, Polk's
corps), which
had been sent
to the right by
Beauregard at
9 o'clock as a
reinforcement
while Cheatham's
second brigade
(Bushrod Johnson)
continued to fight
opposite Sherman.
Stevens had arrived
in front of William
Wallace at 10
o'clock and it
was he who had
engaged his artillery.
Thomas Jordan,
Beauregard's ubiquitous
chief of staff
(and a roommate
of Sherman's at
West Point), arrived
at 11 o'clock
and in Beauregard's
name (but actually
on his own initiative),
ordered Cheatham,
who had also arrived
on the scene,
to take the battery
in Prentiss's
rear. Stevens
led his men forward
for a distance
of 300 yards over
open ground and
when they were
30 yards from
the enemy took
a murderous volley
from the 14th
Ohio, which had
been waiting patiently
on Wallace's left.
Stevens' left
crumpled while
his right was
pushed back by
Lauman on Hurlbut's
right, but not
before putting
up a fight that
lasted half an
hour with each
of his men firing
about 30 rounds.
After they had
all retreated,
Bragg found Randall
Gibson's brigade
unoccupied in
the rear and threw
a fit. He ordered
it to attack immediately.
When the men moved
past the remnants
of Cheatham's
force, the latter
fired into their
backs, convinced
they were enemy
soldiers, killing
or wounded 105
of them. Gibson
continued to advance
and at 12 o'clock
found himself
opposite Prentiss,
where he received
another round
of deadly fire
and retreated.
Bragg sent him
forward again.
The men advanced
with their shoulders
hunched and their
heads bent as
though walking
in a storm and
each round of
enemy fire caused
the rebel force
to sway like wheat.
As at Bull Run,
many forgot to
remove their ramrods
from their gun
barrels and were
surprised to see
them stuck in
the enemy like
arrows. This time
Gibson got to
within shouting
distance of the
enemy and almost
took a battery
before being driven
off again, leaving
behind the best
of his men piled
up with their
guts spilling
out on the ground,
heads severed
from bodies and
bodies sliced
in half. Bragg
ordered a third
attack and the
rebels were thrown
back a third time.
Bragg declared
that Gibson was
a coward. He had
lost 700 men.
Stevens had lost
500.
At the height
of the fighting,
Grant rode over
to Prentiss and
asked him to hold
on "at all
hazards,"
because Lew Wallace
was on the way.
Later, at around
one o'clock, he
met with Buell,
who had arrived
at the Landing
in a steamboat.
It turned out
that Nelson was
still in Savannah
waiting for a
guide. There was
no sign of Lew
Wallace either.
While Buell attempted,
with little success,
to disperse the
men cowering under
the riverbank,
Grant returned
to the battlefield.
He had been galloping
from point to
point for three
hours now, shifting
troops and rallying
the men. His calm
exterior reflected
absolute confidence
despite the precarious
situation. But
with the Hornet's
Nest under attack,
the entire right
wing of the Federal
army under Sherman's
command again
began to collapse.
As Sherman fell
back to the Purdy
road under the
attack of Anderson
and Bushrod Johnson,
Raith fell back
to the main Corinth
road under attack
by Wood and Alexander
Stewart, near
the Purdy junction.
Marsh and Hare
(McClernand's
division) were
sent to Raith's
left – Hare
to the extreme
left, north of
the Review Field.
Stewart ordered
the 4th Tennessee
to take the Federal
battery behind
Marsh. The regiment
got to within
30 feet before
the Northerners
realized that
they were enemy
forces and then
opened fire and
overran the two
regiments on Marsh's
left, the 45th
and 48th Illinois.
Another two Southern
regiments, Wood's
16th Alabama and
27th Tennessee,
captured the battery.
The 4th Tennessee
veered off to
the right and
captured another
gun, from MacAlister's
battery, which
had been positioned
between Marsh
and Hare. Another
two regiments
captured Marsh's
third battery.
Marsh had in effect
been wiped off
the map in McClernand's
center. Hare was
next, dissolving
opposite Shaver,
who had continued
to advance after
overrunning Peabody
in the morning.
In the meanwhile,
Wood did not stop
with Marsh but
continued to move
forward until
running into Veach
on the Corinth
road. Veach had
been sent there
in the morning
by Hurlbut to
reinforce Sherman.
The two regiments
on his right were
immediately crushed
but the other
two held on, keeping
up steady fire
until the rebel
advance in their
front ground to
a halt. The fighting
in this sector
had lasted 50
minutes. It was
now 11 o'clock.
Raith, too, at
the Purdy-Corinth
junction, managed
to slow down the
rebel advance.
Anderson, Bushrod
Johnson and two
of Russell's regiments
(Clark's division)
met with fierce
resistance and
could not continue
their pursuit.
But then Raith
was wounded and
his stalwart brigade
retreated. All
these delays enabled
Sherman and McClernand
to organize still
another line of
defense, between
Sowell field and
the Cavalry Field,
about half a mile
to the north and
even to mount
a counterattack.
But in the end,
this line too
collapsed. Sherman
retreated to the
River Road and
McClernand soon
joined him.
On the far right
of the Southern
advance, opposite
David Stuart and
McArthur, Chalmers
waited till noon
before mounting
another attack.
Stuart occupied
a ridge and could
not be budged.
Chalmers took
400 casualties
and accomplished
nothing. In the
meanwhile, Breckinridge's
reserve had been
called into action.
In effect, Stuart
and McArthur were
anchoring the
Union left and
keeping the rebels
from penetrating
deep into the
rear in accordance
with the original
plan of the Confederates
to cut off the
Federal army from
the Tennessee
River and drive
it toward Owl
Creek. Breckinridge
arrived at 11
o'clock and deployed
his men behind
Chalmers and Jackson
but could not
get them to move,
despite the fact
that they had
been so fired
up that morning
that no one wanted
to stay behind
to guard the equipment.
Stethis was ordered
to move around
McArthur and attach
Hurlbut in the
peach orchard
on Prentiss's
far left but engaged
in desultory movement
opposite McArthur
for an hour without
attacking. Albert
Sidney Johnson
rode to the front
of the brigade,
together with
Breckinridge and
the governor of
Tennessee, and
made a fiery speech
in the accepted
style, finally
getting the men
to move. Another
of Breckinridge's
brigades (Bowen's),
together with
Jackson, attacked
McArthur and when
McArthur's last
regiment collapsed
with 365 of its
617 men lost and
Stuart remained
isolated a half
mile away on the
Union left, Stethis
moved up to the
orchard and crushed
Pugh's brigade.
Stuart decided
to fall back so
that now both
the left and right
of the Hornet's
Nest position
were completely
exposed.
At 2:30 p.m.,
Albert Sidney
Johnston was killed.
He had ridden
to Stethis's right,
holding a cup
that he had taken
from one of the
Federal camps
as "my share
of the booty,"
as he joked. His
horse had been
shot four times,
his uniform was
in tatters and
a bullet had smashed
the heel of his
boot, but Johnston
seemed to be all
right. However,
a few minutes
after Stethis's
assault, his face
went pale and
he slumped in
his saddle. "General,"
the governor exclaimed.
"Have you
been hit?"
"Yes,"
Johnston replied,
"and I'm
afraid it's serious."
It is doubtful
whether Johnston
had even felt
the bullet hit
him and certainly
had not noticed
his boot filling
up with blood.
It turned out
that the bullet
had cut the artery
behind his knee.
By the time he
was gotten down
from his horse
he had lost a
great quantity
of blood and was
losing consciousness.
In a quarter of
an hour he was
dead. Everyone
was in shock and
men rode off to
inform Bragg and
Beauregard of
what had happened.
But the attack
continued. Bowen,
Jackson and Chalmers
began to flank
Hurlbut on the
eastern side of
the orchard. Hurlbut
sent Lauman's
brigade there.
Lauman took up
a position in
Wicker field and
at the same time
the Tyler opened
fire on the rebels
from the river.
But the pressure
on Lauman continued,
until Hurlbut,
fearing that he
would be cut off
from the river,
ordered a retreat.
Prentiss also
fell back, but
only slightly,
positioning himself
facing east with
his back to William
Wallace, about
150 yards behind
Wallace's line
in Duncan field.
Though Sherman's
men had vanished
from the right
and he was in
danger of being
encircled, Prentiss
held fast, determined
to obey Grant's
command to hold
on at any price.
By 4 p.m., the
rebels had 62
guns trained on
Prentiss and Wallace
and rebel forces
were moving in
from every direction.
Breckinridge with
Chalmers and Jackson
from the east,
Anderson, Stevens,
Adams and Forest's
cavalry from the
south, Alexander
Stewart from the
west, and Russell
and Turbue from
the north. Prentiss
and Wallace continued
to fight. A pool
of water near
the orchard where
the wounded and
dying crawled
to drink turned
red and came to
be known as the
Bloody Pond. Wallace
was wounded and
his men, like
Hurlbut's, began
to fall back toward
the Landing. Prentiss
remained alone
with the remnants
of seven regiments.
One after another
they were surrounded
and surrendered.
By 5:30 p.m.,
everyone had been
taken prisoner,
including Prentiss
– a total
of 2,200 men.
Thanks to Prentiss's
courageous stand,
Grant had gained
precious time
– the time
needed to establish
his last line
of defense at
the Landing. Sixty
cannons were positioned
behind the remnants
of Wallace and
Hurlbut, who now
held an 800-yard
line facing south
between the river
and the River
Road. On their
right, arching
toward Snake Creek
and facing west
along the River
Road, were Sherman
and McClernand.
When asked if
the situation
was not desperate,
Grant replied
calmly: "They
won't be able
to break us tonight
– it's too
late. Tomorrow
we'll attack them
with fresh troops
and of course
we'll drive them
back."
Chalmers and Jackson
tried to advance
against Grant's
cannons but failed.
At this point,
an hour before
dark, Beauregard
decided to call
off the attack,
because of the
onset of night,
the fatigue of
the men and the
disorder in their
ranks, which had
been magnified
by the fire from
Grant's riverboats.
Beauregard was
convinced that
all that remained
was to mop up
in the morning
to complete the
victory. Bragg
thought differently.
From the moment
Beauregard issued
his orders, he
was convinced
that the battle
was lost. Neither
of them knew that
the reinforcements
that Grant had
been impatiently
waiting for all
day had finally
arrived. Nelson
reported at the
landing at 4:30
and by nine in
the evening had
extended Grant's
line in the direction
of the river on
his left. At 7:30,
Lew Wallace arrived
from Crump's Landing
and deployed his
men to the right
of Sherman on
the River Road.
At 9 p.m., Buell's
second division
(Thomas Crittenden's)
began crossing
the river. Wallace
arrived with 5,000
men after taking
seven hours to
march 8 miles,
leading them in
every conceivable
direction. Nelson
and Crittenden
had 12,000 men
and Rousseau's
brigade (McCook's
division), now
also starting
to cross the river,
numbered 2,250.
These replaced
the estimated
7,000-10,000 men
who had fled the
battlefield and
huddled near the
riverbank and
all those lying
dead and wounded
on the battlefield.
Beauregard of
course had no
way to make up
his losses. His
men spent the
night looting
and glutting themselves
and thousands
made off for Corinth
with their booty.
Prentiss, interrogated
by his rebel captors,
ridiculed them,
letting them know
what awaited them
in the morning.
Forrest returned
from nighttime
reconnaissance
and told Hardee
that Buell's troops
were moving into
the Union line
and proposed a
night attack before
the Federal force
was sufficiently
strengthened and
organized –
or an immediate
retreat. Hardee
sent him to Beauregard,
but Forrest could
not find him.
The Northern boats
continued to fire
at the rebels
throughout the
night. Beauregard
sent a telegram
to Jefferson Davis
proclaiming "complete
victory"
and went to sleep
in Sherman's tent
near Shiloh Church.
Grant slept under
the stars. His
ankle was swollen.
At around midnight
a hard rain began
to fall so he
sought shelter
in one of the
cabins near the
Landing, but the
sight of the surgeons
amputating limbs
drove him back
into the rain.
The wounded were
laid out on the
decks of the riverboats
or remained on
the battlefield
in puddles of
blood and water.
The rain stopped
at around 3 a.m.
Grant told Sherman
that, as at Fort
Donelson, when
both sides are
exhausted, the
one who attacks
first will win
the battle. Nonetheless,
like Beauregard,
Grant did not
think to issue
orders. Buell,
on the other hand,
readied himself
for the next day
without reference
to Grant, of whom
he did not have
a very high opinion,
given the results
of the day's fighting.
He also considered
his command independent
of Grant's. The
two armies in
effect represented
the two wings
of the Federal
line: on the right,
from right to
left, were Lew
Wallace, Sherman,
McClernand and
Hurlbut; on the
left, from left
to right, were
Nelson, Crittenden
and McCook. At
dawn, Nelson began
to advance.
Beauregard had
barely 20,000
battle-ready men
and waited in
vain for reinforcements
from the west.
Hardee was on
the right with
the brigades of
Chalmers and Jackson.
Breckenridge was
on Hardee's left
and then Polk
with Cheatham's
division and Bragg
with the rest
of his corps and
with Clark (Polk's
corps). Again
it began to rain.
Nelson moved south
through Hurlbut's
camps along the
River Road. The
ground was covered
with the dead
and wounded and
some of the dying
begged to be put
out of their misery.
In Wicker field,
north of the peach
orchard, Hazen
came up against
Chalmers and the
two forces traded
fire until eight
in the morning.
In the meanwhile,
Crittenden and
Rousseau came
up on Nelson's
right. When Chalmers'
men ran out of
ammunition they
retreated to David
Stuart's abandoned
camps.
Withers, Chalmers'
commanding officer,
advanced to the
Purdy road with
reinforcements
at 9 o'clock.
On his left was
Bowen's brigade
(commanded by
Martin). Nelson
advanced to the
orchard. Bruce,
on his right,
was hit by artillery
fire and fell
back to the Bloody
Pond. Hardee ordered
his men to attack.
This they did,
with Hardee among
them on his magnificent
black horse and
everyone shouting,
"Bull Run!
Bull Run!"
but to no avail.
Nelson counterattacked.
Facing superior
numbers, the rebels
were forced to
fall back again,
but with the arrival
of one of Pond's
regiments (from
Ruggles' division)
they regrouped
and this time
it was Hazen who
fell back under
Southern artillery
fire and also
was mistakenly
fired on from
behind by one
of Crittenden's
brigades. At the
orchard, the 2nd
Kentucky (Bruce's
brigade) lost
two-thirds of
its men. Hardee
organized three
regiments and
attacked the exposed
right flank of
Nelson at 10:30,
but the rebels
were hit by enemy
fire from the
edge of the woods
and fled. Chalmers
returned to the
fray at 11 o'clock
with two regiments
and advanced against
Amen on Nelson's
left but was pushed
back by the 36th
Indiana. Amen
pursued Chalmers
to the Purdy road.
At noon, Withers
dispatched Maney
with remnants
of Alexander Stewart's
brigade and the
154th Tennessee
(Bushrod Johnson's
brigade) to the
Purdy road to
reinforce Chalmers
and managed to
drive off Amen,
But Amen's artillery
continued to fire
from the woods
and was able to
slow down the
rebel advance.
An artillery duel
then developed
that allowed the
exhausted man
to rest for a
while.
In the area of
the Sunken Road
near Duncan field,
Crittenden was
attacked by Trabue
(Breckinridge).
Trabue was stopped
cold, leaving
55 bodies on a
patch of ground
30 yards square.
Bragg sent the
remnants of Trabue
and Russell (four
regiments) against
Rousseau on Crittenden's
right. Two attacks
were repulsed
and now Boyle
and Sooey Smith
(Crittenden's
division) advanced
to the Review
Field and captured
two of the rebel's
cannons. The two
sides continued
to fight desperately.
At 1 o'clock Rousseau
and Smith again
advanced. Trabue
fell back, abandoning
his cannons after
almost all their
horses were killed.
Rousseau, now
out of ammunition,
was replaced by
Kirk and William
Gibson. With the
arrival of McCook,
the North now
had 40,000 men
in action. Anderson,
Cheatham, Russell
and others moved
toward Rousseau's
abandoned position
and tried to flank
Gibson but without
success. The massive
concentration
of Federal forces
was beginning
to turn the tide,
slowly pushing
back the rebels.
By 1 o'clock.
Beauregard was
already considering
a general retreat.
Meanwhile, on
the Federal right,
Lew Wallace and
Sherman had advanced
cautiously past
Tiligman Creek.
At 9 o'clock in
the morning they
ran into Ruggles
in Jones field
with Randall Gibson
and Wood, driving
both back with
artillery fire.
McClernand and
Hurlbut came up
on Sherman's left.
The remnants of
their three divisions
barely formed
a 400-yard line,
numbering just
7,000 men. Cleburne
was sent forward
but was quickly
driven back, as
was Cheatham and
Anderson. Rousseau,
on the left, west
of Duncan field,
fired into their
flank and they
all fell back
toward Shiloh
Church. At 2:30,
Beauregard organized
a counterattack
with Trabue, Pond
and others. Beauregard
himself bore the
battle flag and
Bragg joined him,
but they too were
driven back, by
McCook. Beauregard
had already issued
orders for a general
retreat at 2 p.m.
By 4, the two
armies had broken
off contact and
all the Southern
forces were streaming
toward Corinth.
Buell and Hurlbut
continued their
advance up to
Sherman's camps
but broke off
their pursuit
in the face of
stiff resistance
from the rebel
rear guard. Subsequently,
Lew Wallace advanced
another mile or
so, up to a house
where rebel wounded
were being kept,
but also gave
up the chase.
It rained again
in the night,
mixed with snow
and hale. In the
morning, Sherman
was ordered to
resume the pursuit
but ran into Forrest's
cavalry, which
drove back Sherman's
own cavalry and
scouts. Sherman
too abandoned
the chase. Breckinridge
kept his reserve
corps in the vicinity
for three days
but did not see
any signs on the
part of the North
that they wished
to resume the
fighting.
The rebel army
was in tatters.
About 5,000 wounded
men were making
their way back
to Corinth piled
into wagons without
any shelter from
the rain and snow
and hale "like
partridge eggs."
Mules pulled the
wagons through
mud and water
that came up to
their bellies.
Others were carried
on stretchers
or went on foot
with torn or broken
limbs. In Corinth
they were housed
in churches and
private homes
or remained outside.
Eight of every
ten amputations
ended in death
and there was
chaos everywhere.
Grant too licked
his wounds. For
five full days
his men buried
the dead. Such
horrors had never
before been seen
on an American
battlefield. It
was said that
acre after acre
of ground could
be crossed walking
on the bodies
of corpses. The
dead were buried
in ditches, one
on top of the
other. Nelson
offered one of
his shirts to
cover the body
of Albert Sidney
Johnston, which
had been stripped
bare by Northern
looters. The smell
of rotting flesh
was everywhere.
Union losses were
13,047, including
1,754 killed,
8,408 wounded
and 2,885 captured
or missing. The
rebels lost 10,699
– 1,728
killed, 8,012
wounded and 959
missing. Of the
commanders of
Grant's six divisions
and 14 brigades,
nine had been
killed or wounded.
Among them was
William Wallace,
who had stood
firm alongside
Prentiss at the
Hornet's Nest
for six hours.
That same morning
his wife had arrived
on one of the
riverboats to
surprise him and
had waited all
through the day
with mounting
anxiety. In the
evening she was
told that he had
remained on the
battlefield with
a head wound.
The next morning
he was found and
brought to her,
shot in the temple
and eye but still
breathing. For
three days he
lay in delirium
and when he could
no longer see
he felt her hands
to find her wedding
band and make
sure she was still
there, and then
he died.
Halleck arrived
from St. Louis
a few days later
to take charge
amid the tremendous
public outburst
of shock and dismay
following the
publication of
the casualty figures.
Losses in this
single battle
were almost as
great as those
suffered by American
troops in all
of the country's
previous wars
combined. But
to Halleck's credit
it must be said
that he defended
his officers,
and in terms of
personal advancement
he himself was
the greatest beneficiary
of the battle.
Three months later,
after allowing
Beauregard to
slip away from
Corinth, he was
called to Washington
to replace McClellan
as commanding
general of all
the Union armies.
Grant, for his
part, went on
to his great victories
at Vicksburg and
Chattanooga in
1863 until he
too was called
East as general
in chief to achieve
the final victory
against Lee in
Virginia while
Sherman captured
Atlanta and marched
to the sea.
The American Civil
War claimed 650,000
lives. Grant at
Shiloh taught
America what war
was and the war
taught America
that it was one
nation, creating
a sense of nationality
that had not existed
before. No event
in American history
has produced such
an extensive literature,
with over 50,000
books written
to date. The Shiloh
battlefield reports
and correspondence
may be read in
the two Shiloh
volumes of the
128-volume Official
Records issued
by the U.S. War
Department in
1880-1901. Wiley
Sword's Shiloh:
Bloody April (1974)
is a definitive
history of the
battle. Bruce
Catton's Grant
Moves South (1960)
describes all
of Grant's Western
campaigns. William
S. McNealy's Pulitzer
Prize-winning
Grant (1981) takes
in the entire
life, and Grant's
own Personal Memoirs
covers both the
Mexican and Civil
Wars. Called by
Mark Twain the
greatest military
memoir since Julius
Caesar's Commentaries,
it was undertaken
by Grant to provide
for his family
after he was diagnosed
with throat cancer
and was completed
nine days before
his death in 1885.
It brought the
family $450,000.
"WAR
IS HELL":
THE BATTLE OF
SHILOH FOR BEGINNERS
Copyright 2013
by
Fred Skolnik
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